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Preliminary Comments

The Chairman:

A. Asked members if they could advise of any new developments concerning the polygraph provisions of NSDD-196. Mr. Rubino replied that a Justice attorney had stated that those provisions are "on hold" until Secretary of State Shultz's concerns about the polygraph are resolved. []

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B. Informed members that he had asked Lt. Col. Hibler to provide a status report on Project SLAMMER at the May meeting. [] said Messrs. Hibler and Ault (FBI agent actively involved in SLAMMER) have discussed project legal issues with the Department of Justice. The first interview is expected to take place soon. []

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C. Reported that the SECOM-approved revisions to DCID 1/14 were sent to the DCI for review leading to approval and publication of an updated version of the directive. []

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D. Advised that members would be sent a draft revision of DCID 1/19, based on Compartmentation Subcommittee review of an earlier draft. Mr. [] asked members to review the draft soon after they receive it.

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E. Noted that the DCI Information Handling Committee (IHC) will be involved in efforts to update DCID 1/16. IHC involvement in the Dr. Ruth Davis effort to safeguard critical systems has involved them in the computer security field. [] said he had been invited to participate in an IHC seminar which will discuss, among other things, DCID 1/16 revision. He agreed with the IHC chairman that IHC would present SECOM whatever recommendations, draft replacement DCID, etc., they may formulate, and that SECOM and its Computer Security Subcommittee will review it and either send it to the DCI for promulgation or respond with constructive criticism in a very short time. If SECOM does not respond on time, Chairman SECOM will invite IHC to propose changes to the DCI. [] said he hoped that would not happen. He noted that the IHC chairman points out, with justification, that SECOM and its subcommittee have an execrable record on DCID 1/16. He added that if the subcommittee produces something of its own in the meantime, SECOM will address it. []

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F. Invited attention to his 2 April 1986 memorandum to members (SECOM-D-090) noting [] resignation as Computer Security Subcommittee chairman and asking for nominees by 16 April to succeed him. [] asked members who they wanted to nominate. [] said he would provide a nominee. []

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G. Stated that [] and other subcommittee chairmen have noted a lack of depth in representation on their subcommittees. Some members do not have designated alternates, which results in no representation when primary members cannot attend because of priority requirements. Mr. [] asked members to review their representation on all SECOM subcommittees and to designate alternates where needed. []

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ACTION: SECOM members are requested to review their department or agency representation on subcommittees and working groups and to designate alternates to represent them when their primary representatives are unable to attend meetings.

H. Reported that the CIA-managed, [] project is proceeding well. [] said the technical security advantages of this type of enclosure could well benefit the Community. No non-CIA agencies are participating in the [] Advisory Working Group. Working group members are prepared to welcome Community representatives. Mr. [] suggested that agencies with significant technical security concerns carefully consider designating knowledgeable persons to participate. He asked that inquiries about this be directed to [] of the staff on

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J. Informed members that a retirement party for [] is scheduled for 1730-1930 hours, Friday, 30 May 1986, in the CIA Executive Dining Room. []

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ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes

The minutes of the 19 March 1986 meeting were approved as written.

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ITEM 2 Proposed Policy on Controlled Executive Disclosure

[redacted] noted discussion at the March meeting of [redacted] proposed policy on this subject as a means to curb unauthorized disclosures, and his request for comments on it. The Justice, FBI, Army, Navy and Treasury members commented negatively. NSA supports the intent of the proposal and suggests it be referred to the Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee (UDIS) for preparation of a final draft. CIA supports it but notes several portions need work, such as the approach to declassification of disclosed information and the need for a prohibition against recipient agencies disclosing without consent an originating agency's information. Mr. [redacted] invited further member comments. [redacted]

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Mr. Rubino said he would defer to the FBI in consideration of the investigative aspect of the proposal. Mr. Stoops said the FBI is concerned about the opportunity for someone other than the originator to release information and the need to use the system prescribed by E.O. 12356 to declassify information. [redacted] said he didn't believe there is anything in his proposal which authorizes a recipient to release someone else's

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information. He noted that releases of intelligence must be coordinated with the DCI; of defense information with DoD; of foreign relations information with State. He acknowledged that his proposal does not address declassification. [REDACTED] said the language of the proposal should be revised to avoid misinterpretation. Mr. Rubino said the Justice alternate member of UDIS was concerned about the proposal and should be consulted to overcome his objections. [REDACTED]

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Mr. Stoops asked how the proposal would stop a senior official from disclosing sensitive information. [REDACTED] said the proposal would make unilateral disclosures a violation of Administration directives and provide a basis for action. He noted that an advantage of this type of action is the opportunity it would provide to publicize Administration policy and give Cabinet officers a tool to use in disciplining violators. The proposal, if effected, would make more people realize that leaks are not sanctioned. Mr. Rubino asked who authorized the release of classified intelligence on recent Libyan terrorism. [REDACTED] replied that there had been agreement to release some information on this to a foreign country. He said he did not know of any other coordinated disclosures. Mr. Robinson noted that cables to ambassadors on authorized releases contain strict caveats on further releases. [REDACTED] cited a recent incident in which classified information provided in a briefing [REDACTED] appeared in the local media very soon after the briefing. [REDACTED] acknowledged that such abuses of security discipline are difficult to stop but stressed the need for the security community to keep pushing for remedies.

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Mr. Stoops advised that FBI leak investigations are sometimes aborted when the agents get too close to the culprit and the leak becomes an authorized disclosure. Members discussed problems with security discipline concerning unauthorized disclosures. [REDACTED] concluded the discussion by stating that it would be useful to send the proposal to UDIS with a strong charge to develop a workable proposal to address the problem.

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ACTION: The SECOM staff will prepare tasking to the UDIS on this matter. [REDACTED]

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ITEM 3 Personnel Security

[REDACTED] noted discussion at the March meeting of personnel security considerations bearing on a request by Representatives Edwards and Schroeder for testimony on "the nexus, demonstrated through a scientifically valid method, between ... types of behavior ... and espionage." Points made in that discussion included:

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- Some appear to believe that certain issues have no relevance to security.

- Some question what data may be sought, as well as what is done with data during the adjudicative process. [REDACTED]

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[] noted receipt of informal observations by some members. He said there seems to be a sort of consensus that a scientific nexus can't be established. One can't effectively predict that a person with certain characteristics will become a spy or criminal. The converse can't be predicted either. He observed that the Community has evolved a set of criteria to guide our personnel security actions. Members discussed approaches to adjudicating cases involving sexual misconduct. Mr.

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[] noted comments, in a security adjudicative standards seminar conducted by a Community agency, by an Army psychiatrist who stated that the US Government is not a rehabilitative organization and shouldn't hire people with problems. [] said US secrets are at risk in every personnel security decision we make. He said we use established criteria on good character and apply those criteria across the board to screen out those who don't measure up. [] said every adjudication is a prediction of future behavior. Regarding possible scientific validation of personnel security criteria, he advised that he had met Dr. Richard Elster, the new director of the DoD Personnel Security Research and Education Center. He said he hoped to get Dr. Elster to address a SECOM meeting. [] asked [] the OGC representative at the meeting, to comment on informal observations by members on this subject. []

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ITEM 4 New Business

A. Mr. Rubino advised that there were now 61 persons seeking security clearance to participate in the General Dynamics defense. He said there would be two major storage sites for classified documents - one on each coast. He said Justice will be asking the Army to provide security assistance in this case. []

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B. [] reported on the status of SECOM R&D projects:

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- Battelle Institute is working on development of a concept for a videotape on unauthorized disclosures. The project officer has visited the SECOM staff to discuss the leak problem. []

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- CIA's Office of Research and Development is working on the advanced polygraph project. They will try to determine if brain activity indicates whether someone is being deceptive. []

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- The polygraph validity study is continuing under NSA management. About 50% of the NSA polygraph examiners have been trained to collect the data needed for this study. []

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- The Naval Postgraduate School is working on the project to interview persons being discharged for suitability after having been cleared. Preliminary findings include signs that blatant security problems have been ignored by supervisors. []

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- The personal computer security guidelines have been completed and approved by SECOM. []

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- Two projects [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] are underway, using magnetic and radio frequency approaches. [REDACTED]

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- Project SLAMMER will be discussed at the May meeting. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] invited member agencies to contribute funds to these efforts. [REDACTED]

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C. [REDACTED] said he had heard that Defense is considering excluding coverage of terrorism and sabotage in screening polygraph examinations. He asked Mr. Williams if he knew anything about this. Mr. Williams replied "not a thing." [REDACTED]

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D. [REDACTED] advised that Mr. Casey is anxious to do something positive to demonstrate US Government resolve to combat leaks. He introduced FBI Special Agent William Hart, the new chief of SECOM's Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center, and said he was pleased with Bill's work. [REDACTED]

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E. Mr. Williams said Defense is concerned about Congressional requests for access to Special Access Programs. He added that the number of people who want access to this material poses security problems. [REDACTED]

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ITEM 5 Next Meeting

[REDACTED] advised that the next regular meeting will be at 10:00 a.m., Wednesday, 14 May 1986, in room 7D32, CIA Headquarters. [REDACTED]

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Executive Secretary

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